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The aim of this paper is to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on the 
relationship between international remittances and income inequality. In simple 
cross-country regressions we find a non-monotonic link between these two 
variables when using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables; we also test 
our hypothesis using dynamic panel data methods. We provide evidence in 
support of existing theoretical work that accounts for network effects that describe 
how, in the first stages of migration history, there is an inequality-increasing 
effect of remittances on income inequality. Then, as the opportunity cost of 
migrating is lowered due to these effects, remittances sent to those households 
have a negative impact on inequality. We also show how education and the 
development of the financial sector can help countries to reach the inequality-
decreasing section of the curve more quickly. Our results are robust to several 
empirical specifications, as well as for a wide variety of inequality measures. 
 
JEL Classification: O1, O15, J16 
Key Words: Migration, International Remittances, Income distribution  
                                                 
* We greatly thank Alberto Chong and participants in seminars held at the Universidad del Pacífico and the Inter-
American Development Bank, who provided insightful comments and suggestions to previous versions of this 
paper. Sebastian Ipince provided excellent assistance during the initial stages of this research. The views and 
opinions in this paper should not be attributed to the Universidad del Pacífico (UP), the Inter-American 
Development Bank, or their corresponding executive directors. The standard disclaimer applies. Correspondence: 
León, Research Department, Stop B-900, Inter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Avenue, NW, 
Washington, DC 20577, USA. Tel. (202) 623-1932; Fax (202) 623-2481. E-mail: gianmarcol@iadb.org
  41. Introduction 
 
During the last few years, a great migratory movement has been taking place around the world, 
probably the biggest in modern history. People are leaving their home countries looking for 
better job opportunities and a better quality of life in foreign countries. According to the United 
Nations (2003), there were around 175 million people living and working outside their home 
countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  The World Bank (2006) estimates that the 
worldwide total amount of remittances is twice that of foreign aid. Moreover, these migratory 
and economic flows are likely to continue as long as labor demand from industrialized countries, 
with their ageing populations, continues to increase. The study of these financial flows and their 
effects on recipient countries has obviously become relevant. 
Remittances flows have proven to be a stable source of capital for poor countries because 
they do not depend on the same external factors as other kinds of private capital flows. In fact, 
between 1980 and 2000, remittances inflows to developing countries ranged between 1 and 1.6 
percent of GDP, while other private capital flows such as exports, FDI, and official aid were 
subject to cyclical fluctuations and external shocks (IMF, 2004). Examples of the volatility of 
private capital flows and steadiness (or countercyclicality) of remittances can be found in 
countries including Indonesia in 1997, Ecuador in 1999, and Argentina after 2001. On the other 
hand, remittances flows may generate negative effects on the macroeconomic environment. 
Several studies document the risks associated with these kinds of capital inflows. Bourdet and 
Falck (2003), for instance, document how the remittances flow generated real exchange 
appreciations and Dutch disease in Cape Verde. Along the same lines, IMF (2006) points out the 
pervasive effects of international remittances on output volatility, export competitiveness, credit 
ratings, and investment volatility. Other risks associated with remittances may be the financing 
of terrorist movements, or civil wars, as have been shown by Kapur (2004) for the case of 
Somalia in the 1991 conflict, where rural guerrillas were largely financed by international 
remittances.
1
Despite the fact that a wide strand of economic research has investigated the effects of 
remittances on a variety of topics, there is no formal cross-country analysis of the impact of 
                                                 
1 Kapur (2004) also mentions these kind of financing for separatist movements in Sweden, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom. 
  5remittances on income inequality. In fact, the effect on income distribution is not yet clear.
2 For 
example, Adams (1989), using a sample of small rural communities in Egypt, found that 
international migration worsens income distribution in the home community. Nevertheless, using 
a very similar approach, Adams (1992) found that there is no significant effect of remittances on 
income inequality in rural Pakistan. On the other hand, Barham and Boucher (1998), using a 
sample from three coastal communities in Nicaragua, found that, when remittances are taken as 
an exogenous factor, they had an inequality-reducing effect. On the other hand, when remittances 
are taken as substitutes for local production (an endogenous factor), the effect was exactly the 
opposite. Taylor (1992) and Taylor and Wyatt (1996) noted that beyond the direct effect of 
remittances on income, remittances also relax the credit constraints for people with liquidity 
restrictions. Using a sample of 55 rural communities in Mexico, they found evidence that the 
effect of remittances on income was higher for those households with non-liquid assets. 
Remittances provide poorer households the possibility of access to the credit market, which in 
turn finance the accumulation of productive assets, increasing future income. This indirect effect 
on income tends to be equally distributed among income groups in Mexico, having the effect of 
improving the overall income distribution.  
  On the other hand, Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986), taking advantage of a natural 
experiment with two Mexican communities, one with a longer migration history, and the other 
with a shorter one, found that the impact of remittances on inequality depends on migration 
history and the degree to which opportunities to migrate are disseminated among households in 
the community. At the first stages of migration, only the richest households in the community 
can afford the high migration costs due to lack of information and the labor market risks implied. 
In this sense, the first effect observed is likely to be the rise of inter-household inequality. As 
more people migrate, however, the migration costs tend to diminish because of the information 
and assistance provided to potential migrants (network effects).
3 Based on these results, the 
                                                 
2 Cross-country evidence for the impact of remitttances on poverty has been provided by Adams and Page (2003). 
For a sample of 74 countries, they found that international migration has a significant effect on poverty reduction. 
An increase of 10 percent in the number of migrants reduces the number of people living under the poverty line by 
about 1.9 percent.  
3 Anecdotal evidence on the formation of migrant networks in the host country and their close ties with home 
communities has been reported recently by the Christian Science Monitor. The town of Indaparapeo in Mexico, for 
example, receives remittances from migrants who have settled in the United States. A portion of this money is 
collected through public activities, and its expenditure is being coordinated by the community and the State 
governor. At this point, the money is being used for a program that provides college scholarships for poor young 
people in the town. See Campbell (2006). 
  6authors conclude that the effect of remittances on income inequality depends on how migration 
eases the information flows and how contacts are disseminated within the community. If the 
contacts and the information are not monopolized, then migration and remittances among the 
poorest households will be more likely. According to the authors, this would reverse any 
negative effect on income inequality at the initial stages of migration.  
Along the same lines, McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) argue that, a priori, the effect of 
migration and remittances on income inequality cannot be determined, as it depends upon the 
initial income distribution and the position of potential migrants in that distribution. The authors 
also state that the first migrants will be those located on the higher steps of the income 
distribution, because they have both the means and the incentives to migrate. The inverted U-
shaped effect first described by Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) is here formalized in an 
endogenous migration cost model. The migration channels are formed after the settlement of 
migrant networks in the foreign country,
4 this will tend to lower migration costs, making 
migration affordable for lower-income households. The empirical evidence provided for Mexico 
supports the predictions of their theoretical model.  
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature cited above, we expect a non-monotonic 
relationship between international remittances and income inequality. Because of high migration 
costs (passport, transportation, settlement, etc.), the people willing to assume the opportunity 
cost implied by the migration decision will be the ones located on the higher stages of the 
income distribution, and the remittances they send to their home countries will have a positive 
effect on inequality. As more people migrate, and migrant communities are settled in the foreign 
country, migration costs lowers as the migration channels set up. Due to this process, migration 
is made more accessible for poorer people, which will lead to and income equalizing effect. 
We address this issue empirically in a cross-country set-up. Using data for 78 countries 
between 1970 and 2001, the aim of this paper is to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on 
the relationship between international remittances and income inequality. In simple cross-
country regressions we find a non-monotonic link between these two variables when using 
                                                 
4 Many sociological studies provide evidence of the beneficial effects of the formation of migrant networks in 
foreign countries. For example, Espinosa and Massey (1997) emphasize the role of social networks in lowering the 
information costs and dangers of crossing the Mexican border on the way to the United States. These networks may 
provide useful information on techniques and routes for entering the United States; also they can arrange way to 
provide temporary housing and financial assistance once they have crossed the border. Munshi (2003) finds that 
individuals with larger networks are more likely to be employed and to hold higher-paying jobs upon arrival in the 
United States.  
  7ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and panel data methods. We will provide evidence 
in support of existing theoretical work that accounts for network effects that, in the first stages of 
migration history generates an inequality-increasing effect of remittances. Then, as the 
opportunity cost of migrating is lowered due to these effects, remittances sent to those 
households have a negative impact on inequality. We also show how education and financial 
sector development can help countries to reach the inequality-decreasing section of the curve 
more quickly.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and 
describes the empirical strategy that we will follow. Section 3 presents the first empirical 
evidence of the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between remittances and inequality 
using cross-section methodologies and instrumental variables. Section 4 will present the 
regression analysis using panel data techniques that deal with the fact that the inequality series 
may be persistent over time, which may be biasing our coefficients. Section 5 presents some 
evidence on the channels that may help countries to reach the inequality-decreasing section of 
the curve more quickly. Finally, Section 6 offers conclusions and closing remarks.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
The inequality measure used to test our hypothesis comes from United Nations (2005).
5 This 
extensive dataset, which updates the Gini coefficients reported by Deininger and Squire (1997) 
and World Bank (2005), is comprised of comparable Gini coefficients from several sources; 
these include previous calculations by other authors as well as UN calculations based on 
household surveys. Furthermore, different criteria from different sources are homogenized in 
order to avoid problems of definition.
6 Data on income inequality is available for 133 countries 
from 1960 to 2001. 
Our variable of interest, remittances received from workers abroad, was taken from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005), which in turn collected the data from the 
                                                 
5 Obviously, the Gini coefficient and similar indices also pose some problems. One is that the general coverage 
tends to be sparse and unbalanced. To minimize this problem, the data from the World Bank (2005) combines 
different sources. Still, the question is whether there is any better proxy than these indices for making broad cross-
country comparisons on inequality, and the answer is no. 
6 The definition problems that can arise include whether the data is taken at the individual or household level; 
whether it correspond to income or expenditures; in the former case, whether it is net of taxes or not; or if it 
representative at the national or sub national levels. We only take into account data that is representative at the 
national level, based on income data and weighted to the individual level.  
  8IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. It should be noticed that the data collected by the 
IMF come from reports by each country’s Central Bank, which compile statistics on official 
worker remittances flows, representing only money sent through official banking channels. 
Actual remittances flows may thus be underestimated, because there may be some (unknown) 
amount of money sent home by workers through private or unofficial channels.
7 Due to this 
limitation, the coefficients estimated may be interpreted as a lower bound of the real effect of 
remittances on income inequality. This data covers 166 countries for the period from 1970 to 
2003. 
The control variables to be used in our regressions follow the broad literature that 
estimates the determinants of income inequality in cross-country set ups (Deininger and Squire, 
1997; Calderon and Chong, 2000, 2006; and others
8). Following this literature, we use per capita 
GDP as a proxy for the level of economic development; liquid liabilities, or broad money (M3), 
takes into account the level of development of the financial sector. Our democracy measure, 
taken from the Polity project, is used to proxy for the political situation of the country, and the 
average years of secondary schooling represents the human capital accumulation of the 
population. These variables were taken from several sources, which include World Bank (2005), 
Polity IV, and Barro and Lee (1993).
9 The data available on our dependent and independent 
variables finally leaves us with a sample that covers 78 countries for the period 1970-2001.
10
                                                 
7 For example, Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimated that informal remittances are equivalent to between 35 
percent and 70 percent of the amount of oficial remittances. This difference is explained by the development of the 
local financial sector. 
8 See, for example, Ahluwalia (1976); Li, Squire, and Zhou (1998); Papanek and Kyn (1986); Sudhir and Kanbur 
(1993); Milanovic (1996); and Kuznets (1955), among others. 
9 The definition and sources of all the variables used can be found in Table 1. 
10 The countries included in the analysis are the following: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Burundi, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Phillipines, Poland, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Swizerland, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunesia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
  9Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Gini  coefficient  The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 











Workers’ remittances are current transfers by migrants who are employed or intend 
to remain employed for more than a year in another economy in which they are 
considered residents. Some developing countries classify workers’ remittances as a 
factor income receipt (and thus as a component of GNI). The World Bank adheres to 
international guidelines in defining GNI, and its classification of workers' 
remittances may therefore differ from national practices. This item shows receipts by 
the reporting country. . The variable is expressed as a percentage of the GDP. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and 
data files.  
Real GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in 
constant 2000 US dollars. 
Initial real GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data 
arefrom the first available year in the data set, usually 1970. 
GDP growth  GDP annual growth rate (%) 




Polity  Index of democracy and autocracy calculated by the Polity project. This index ranges 
between –10 and 10, where highest values represent a more democratic regime as 
lower levels, a more autocratic regime. Data are available for the whole 20
th century. 
Polity IV 
Years of secondary 
schooling 
Average years of secondary schooling of the population. 5-year averages are 
available for the period 1960-2000 (the data from the original paper was actualized 





Cost of obtaining a passport in each country. Figures were collected in October 2005 
and in local currency, converted to US dollars at the prevailing interbank exchange 
rate.  The standard used was made by collecting the price of a first-time adult 
passport valid for five years duration, of the standard number of pages and obtained 
via the standard processing period. When the country only issues 10-year passports, 
this is the price reported. The cost collected contains the cost of the passport itself, 
but not the cost of paying for photographs, birth certificates, or other such documents 




The first stage of our empirical analysis will use cross-country averages for the period 
under analysis and run OLS models, as well as instrumental variables, in order to address the 
endogeneity problems that may arise from factors that simultaneously determine income 
inequality and remittances.  
The instrumental variable used is the cost of obtaining a passport in each country. This 
variable, taken as a proxy of the barriers to exit a country, provides an excellent instrument since 
it is not related to income inequality, but strongly associated with the probability of migrating 
and sending remittances to the home country. Data on cost of passports are from McKenzie 
  10(2005) and were collected in October 2005 in local currency, then converted to US dollars at the 
prevailing interbank exchange rate.  The standard used was made by collecting the price of a 
first-time adult passport valid for five years duration, of the standard number of pages and 
obtained via the standard processing period. When the country only issues 10-year passports, this 
is the price reported. The cost collected contains the cost of the passport itself, but not the cost of 
paying for photographs, birth certificates, or other such documents, which are sometimes 
required along with the passport application.
11 Although these data correspond to the end of the 
period under study, it is plausible that the barriers to the exit posted by any government are time 
invariant, so the country ranking will remain unchanged and the data for the end of the period 
will reflect the situation for the whole period.
12
We also prove a panel data analysis in order to address the possible autocorrelation 
problems raised by the fact that the inequality series may be persistent over time. As we will see, 
our results hold when using country level fixed effects and dynamic panel data GMM system 
estimators (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
Finally, we expand our analysis towards determining which channels can help countries 
to reach more quickly the point at which international remittances begin to reduce inequality. We 
do so by interacting our variable of interest with the educational level of the population and the 
financial development of each country. 
 
3. Cross-Section OLS and IV Approach 
 
In the spirit of Barro (1991), the main econometric approach to testing for the existence of a 
significant link between income inequality and remittances is to take simple averages for the 
period 1970-2001 and run a cross-country regression. The empirical specification will be as 
follows: 
i i i i i rem rem X y ε δ δ β α + + + + =
2
2 1 1     ( 1 )  
                                                 
11 In many countries there is not a single passport cost. Costs may differ for children and adults, for renewals, for 
expedited service, and even for duration and number of pages. Also, the justification for not dividing a 10-year 
passport price in half is that potential migrants must pay the full cost of the passport upfront (McKenzie, 2005). 
12 Chong and León (2006) show that the determinants of the barriers to exit a country (as proxied by the cost of 
obtaining a passport) do not vary with time. This supports our statement that the relative ranking of countries does 
not vary over time. 
  11where yi represents the income inequality indicator, as proxied by the Gini coefficient. Similarly, 
Xi  represents the matrix of basic controls. Additionally,    represents the 
vector of our variable of interest and the associated coefficients, international remittances. 
According to the theoretical and empirical literature on remittances and inequality (Stark, Taylor 
and Yitzhaki, 1986; Docquier and Rapoport, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2004; Gonzalez-
Konig and Wodon, 2005), this relationship tends to have the shape of an inverted U. Although no 
formal cross-country analysis has been done yet, country-specific studies highlight the 
importance of network effects and the costs of migration in shaping the relationship between our 
variables of interest. Following the intuition behind the existence of a non-monotonic 
relationship between international remittances and inequality, we will expect a positive sign for 
δ
2
2 1 i i rem rem δ δ +
1 and a negative one for δ2.  
  Figure 1 shows a simple quadratic fit plot after regressing income distribution on 
remittances and remittances squared. This figure shows the non-monotonic relationship existing 
between the two variables of interest in a simple non-formal analysis.  
 
Figure 1. Quadratic Regression Fit of International Remittances 
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Our benchmark regression follows the wide literature on the determinants of income 
distribution. The set of control variables include the level of initial gross domestic product per 
capita, the GDP growth rate, liquid liabilities (M3) as a percentage of gross domestic product, a 
                                                 
13 Data correspond  to simple averages for the period under analysis (1970 to 2001). 
  13democracy measure and the average years of secondary schooling. Summary statistics and the 
correlation matrix for these variables are in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Cross  section        
Gini  coef.  78  44.51 10.16 25.47  65.80 
Remittances  /GDP  78  1.19 2.54 0.00 17.64 
Log(Initial GDP pc)  78  7.35 1.50 4.88 10.27 
GDP growth  78 1.67  1.84  -2.83 7.36 
M3/GDP  78  45.56 27.71 12.50  160.66 
Polity  78 1.80  5.97  -8.78 10.00 
Years of secondary schooling  78  1.15 1.00 0.06  4.38 
Passport cost/GNI pc  65  4.21  8.95  0.12  50.91 
5-year  panel        
Gini  coef.  231  42.69 10.00 19.79  69.08 
Remittances  /GDP  231 1.23 3.06 0.00 22.90 
Log(GDP pc)  231 7.69 1.51 4.95 10.50 
GDP growth  231 2.08 2.85 -5.51 11.02 
M3/GDP  231 47.54  30.73 8.86  190.51 
Polity  231 3.68 6.47 -9.75 10.00 
Years of secondary schooling  231 1.39 1.03 0.05  5.09 
 
Table 3A. Correlation Matrix, Cross-Section 
 (p-value below correlation coefficients) 
 
  





GDP growth M3/GDP Polity  Years of secondary 
schooling 
-0.084             Remittances /GDP 
0.467            
-0.402 -0.139            Log(Initial GDP pc) 
  0.000 0.226           
GDP growth  -0.284 -0.025  0.215         
  0.012 0.830  0.059         
M3/GDP  -0.435 0.104  0.527  0.276       
  0.000 0.367  0.000  0.014       
Polity 2  -0.291 -0.178  0.686  0.152  0.282     
  0.010 0.120  0.000  0.183  0.012     
-0.538 -0.128  0.837  0.256  0.531  0.614    Years of secondary 
schooling  0.000 0.263  0.000  0.024  0.000  0.000   
-0.054 -0.059  -0.507  -0.287 -0.362 -0.394  -0.384  Passport cost/GNI pc 
   0.669 0.640  0.000  0.020  0.003  0.001  0.002 
  14Table 3B. Correlation Matrix, Five-Year Panel Data 
 (p-value below correlation coefficients) 
 
  





GDP growth  M3/GDP  Polity 
-0.040           Remittances /GDP 
0.547          
Log(Initial GDP pc)  -0.378 -0.161         
  0.000 0.015         
GDP growth  -0.119 -0.085  0.077       
  0.071 0.196  0.243       
M3/GDP  -0.360 0.117  0.505  0.167     
  0.000 0.075  0.000  0.011     
Polity 2  -0.196 -0.143  0.577  -0.012  0.208   
  0.003 0.030  0.000  0.852  0.002   
-0.517 -0.072  0.776  0.075  0.493 0.521  Years of secondary 
schooling  0.000 0.274  0.000  0.256  0.000  0.000 
 
  The endogeneity problem is addressed using standard instrumental variables techniques. 
As the costs of migration have an endogenous component (labor market relations, information 
costs, etc.
14) and an exogenous component (imposed by home country governments), we will 
take advantage of the exogenous nature of these costs to instrument our remittances measure. As 
mentioned above, our proxy for barriers to exit is the cost of obtaining a passport. It is expected 
that this cost will affect negatively the level of remittances by limiting the migration flows, and it 
is also expected that these barriers to exit will not have any effect on income distribution within a 
country.  
 
                                                 
14 See Carrington et al. (1996). 
  15Table 4. Cross-Section Regressions for Gini Coefficient 
 
 Gini  coef. 
 OLS  OLS      IV  IV 
Remittances/GDP -0.474  -1.180  20.639  17.959 
 (1.84)*  (1.56)  (4.42)***  (3.70)*** 
(Remittances/GDP)
2     0.049  -7.271  -2.878 
   (1.25)  (2.52)**  (2.57)** 
Initial GDP pc  1.474  1.318  2.883  5.388 
 (1.10)  (0.95)  (2.00)*  (2.74)*** 
GDP growth  -0.712  -0.703  -0.194  1.041 
 (1.56)  (1.57)  (0.30)  (1.69)* 
M3/GDP -0.067  -0.070  -0.138  -0.154 
 (2.24)**  (2.32)**  (3.35)***  (2.92)*** 
Polity -0.050  -0.009  -0.254  -0.149 
 (0.23)  (0.04)  (1.02)  (0.71) 
-5.978 -6.042  -2.837  -7.405  Years of secondary schooling 
(4.00)*** (3.98)*** (1.72)* (3.86)*** 
Constant 45.445  47.098  22.341  16.505 
 (5.36)***  (5.23)***  (2.36)**  (1.38) 
Continental dummies   No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 78  78  65  65 
F test of excluded instruments      7.70  3.95 
p-value     0.0074  0.0520 
R-squared 0.36  0.37  0.50  0.64 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The instrumental 
variable used on the IV regressions is the cost of obtaining a passport. This variable was always significant at the 
conventional levels on the first stage regressions. 
 
  Table 4 presents the OLS and instrumental variables results. The first column uses a 
linear specification using OLS, while the second one tests for a quadratic specification. Finally, 
the third and fourth columns use instrumental variables for our quadratic specification; the 
difference between these columns is the inclusion of dummy variables that control for 
heterogeneities between continents.  
As for the initial GDP per capita, we find positive and statistically significant coefficients 
in the specifications including instrumental variables. Unlike previous evidence presented by 
Deninger and Squire (1997), who find no empirical support for a linear or quadratic relationship 
between GDP per capita and income inequality, we find that countries that were more developed 
in the 1970s are more likely to have a more equal income distribution. As was expected, we 
obtain a negative and significant coefficient for GDP growth, which indicates that countries with 
higher growth rates tend to lower their levels of income inequality; at the same time, our proxy 
for development of the financial system also has a negative and significant coefficient. As has 
been stated in the literature, credit constraints are one of the main factors aggravating income 
  16inequality. In this sense, more developed financial markets will tend to reduce income inequality. 
Unsurprisingly, human capital accumulation, as proxied by the average years of secondary 
schooling, is also significant and yields a negative sign. Finally, we find no significant 
association between our political variable and income inequality. This finding is consistent with 
those in Chong (2004), where he presents evidence in support of a non-linear relationship 
between inequality and democracy.  
In regard to our variable of interest, we find that in the linear specification we obtain a 
positive and significant association between international remittances and income inequality; this 
relationship does not seem statistically robust, however, since neither the linear nor the quadratic 
term is statistically significant when we include the quadratic term in the OLS regression, 
Nevertheless, when we instrument our interest variable we find strong statistical evidence in 
support of our hypothesis: in both specifications, we find a positive and significant coefficient 
for the linear term as well as a negative and significant term for the quadratic term. Moreover, 
the coefficients found for the effect of international remittances on income inequality are robust 
and stable since the inclusion of several other controls do not seem to affect either their 
magnitude or significance.
15  These results confirm our initial intuition that remittances increase 
inequality at the first stage of migration history but at some later point reduce income inequality. 
This relationship holds when using different measures of income inequality and different 
specifications of the empirical model (see robustness checks below).  
The magnitude of the coefficients found can help us find the inflection point where 
remittances lead to a more equal distribution of income. Deriving equation (1) with respect to yi 
we are able to maximize the function, finding a local maximum. Then, we have: 








δ δ                             









                                                
                                                     (2) 
 
15 Column 4 in Table 4 shows the results when including continental controls, although we also try including other 
variables similar to those shown and the coefficients and significance of remittances did not vary significantly. 
These results are available upon request to the authors. 
  17Solving equation (2) with the empirical values found for δ1 and δ2 in column 3 of Table 
4,
16 we find that remittances begin to have a negative effect on the Gini coefficient (inequality 
decreasing) when, ceteris paribus, they represent 1.42 percent or more of GDP, which is roughly 
the level seen in countries like Nepal, India or Guatemala. Sixty of the 78 countries included in 
our sample fall in the inequality-increasing section of the curve; we can find within this group all 
the industrial countries in our sample as well as all the countries from Europe and Central Asia, 
with the exception of Turkey. As predicted by the model, this means that in the increasing part of 
the curve, a 2SD-increase in international remittances (about 0.6 percent the GDP), which is 
roughly like moving from a country with the level of remittances of Uganda (1.03 percent) to 
another with the level of Ecuador (1.7 percent), will increase the Gini coefficient by about 0.3. In 
the same line, in the inequality-decreasing section of the curve, a 2SD-increase in the level of 
remittances will lead to a reduction of the Gini coefficient of about 0.10. 
Our results are also robust to other income inequality measures. Table 5 shows selected 
coefficients after using the same regressions as those of our benckmark specification from Table 
4, but changing the dependent variable for the income shares held by the top 20 percent, top 40 
percent, bottom 20 percent, bottom 40 percent, as well as for the middle 20 percent and the ratios 
between the top and bottom 20 percent and top and bottom 40 percent.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Column 3 of Table 4 is taken as our benchmark specification since it is the one that most closely follows the 
specifications previously used in the literature. 
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   Quadratic specification 
   (Remittances/GDP)  (Remittances/GDP) 
Top 20 / Bottom 20  9.601 -3.956 
  (2.94)*** (2.16)** 
Top 40 / Bottom 40  3.325 -1.308 
  (2.99)*** (2.14)** 
Top 20  12.913 -4.528 
  (3.34)*** (2.25)** 
Bottom 20  -2.660 0.827 
  (2.42)** (1.54) 
Top 40  9.770 -3.305 
  (3.06)*** (2.03)** 
Bottom 40  -6.137 2.004 
  (2.78)*** (1.81)* 
Middle 20  -3.634 1.296 
.15)** 
 at 5%; *** 
kmark regression 
used to obtain these coefficients is the one used on column 3 of Table 4.  Full results 
are available upon request to the authors. 
   (3.15)*** (2
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.*significant at 10%; ** significant
significant at 1%. We show only our interest coefficients. The benc
 
 
According to the endogenous migration costs literature (Carrington et al., 1996), and the 
network effects hypothesis (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2004), we will expect an increase in the 
income share held by the richest percentiles of the income distribution at the first stages of 
migration history. This share will then decrease as the endogenous migration costs start 
diminishing and the poorest households start migrating and sending remittances back home. 
Along the same lines, we expect that, when using the income shares held by the bottom 
percentiles, they will diminish in the first instances but increase after a given point. 
Results in Table 5 confirm the predictions of previous theoretical work and our intuition. 
The coefficients found in the quadratic specifications are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level and yield the expected signs. The coefficients of the ratios between high and low income 
percentiles follow the same patterns as those found for the Gini coefficient in Table 4. The 
results for the income shares held by the lowest percentiles are U-shaped, decreasing in the first 
stages and then turning positive. That same pattern is also followed by the regressions that use as 
  19their dependent variable the income share held by the richest percentiles, which means that, at 
the initial stages of migration history, the income share held by the richest percentiles will 
increase (increasing income inequality also), but at some point these shares will start to decrease. 
The exact opposite pattern is followed in the regressions that use as their dependent variable the 
income share held by the poorest percentiles. Also, as can be seen in the last row of Table 5, the 
income shares held by the middle quintile display the same movement as those of the poorest 
quintiles, decreases in the initial stages of migration and will start increasing at some point. 
 
4. Panel Data GMM-IV Method 
 
The structure of our data also allows us to test our hypothesis using panel data methodologies. 
We use the standard panel data approach of a two-way error component model. This empirical 
approach allows us to control for time invariant country characteristics. The equation to be 
estimated is then:  
 
2
11 2 it it it it i it yX r e m r e m α βδ δ μ ε =+ + + ++                    (3) 
   
In equation (3), yit again represents our inequality measure for year t in country i, and Xit 
is a matrix for all our control variables. remit and remit
2 are our interest variable and its quadratic 
term, respectively, which represents the inverted U-shaped relationship mentioned above. 
Finally, μi is a country specific, time invariant error term, and εit is a random disturbance. In the 
empirical implementation of this model, we use a five-year average panel to minimize the 
problems that may arise from missing data and balance our panel as far as we can. 
Previous panel data research shows that inequality has been highly stable in recent 
decades (Li, Squire, and Zhou, 1998). Moreover, it has been estimated that the correlation of 
inequality between the 1960s and 1980s is around 0.85 (Bruno et al., 1998). Indeed, the ratio of 
incomes of the richest five percent to the poorest five percent of countries has barely moved, 
from 33.2 in 1960 to 31.7 in 1985 (Bruno et al., 1998). In this sense, income inequality may be 
considered a persistent series, so we should control for a potential serial correlation that may be 
biasing our coefficients.  Problems of simultaneity or reverse causation may arise as well. To 
minimize these problems, we also use fixed-effects dynamic panel data GMM-IV techniques 
suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). The advantage of this method is that we are able to 
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estimate simultaneously a regression in levels and a regression in differences, with each equation 
using its own specific set of instrumental variables. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this issue by 
considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall 
validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The second 
test examines the hypothesis that the error term εi,t is not serially correlated. We test whether the 
differenced error term (that is, the residual of the regression in differences) is first and second-
order serially correlated. A first-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected 
even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random path. 
A second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term 
is serially correlated and follows a moving average process of at least an order of one. If the test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation, we conclude that 
the original error term is serially uncorrelated and use the corresponding moment conditions. A 
detailed explanation of these methods can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 6 shows the results for the panel data models. The first and second columns show 
the results for the models using country and time fixed effects for a linear and quadratic 
specification, respectively. The following columns use the dynamic panel data methods.   Gini  coef. 
  Fixed effects  Fixed effects GMM-IV GMM-IV 
Gini (first lag)      0.8613  0.6707 
     (8.70)***  (3.95)*** 
Remittances/GDP -0.078  0.310  0.8239  1.5027 
 (0.35)  (0.79)  (2.05)**  (1.66)* 
(Remittances/GDP)
2     -0.026  -0.0602  -0.0692 
   (1.52)  (3.00)***  (2.08)** 
-3.696 -3.225 1.6072  1.4145  Log(GDP pc) 
 (1.61)  (1.40)  (1.55)  (0.38) 
GDP growth  0.032  0.039  -0.0358  0.4195 
 (0.25)  (0.30)  (0.12)  (0.87) 
M3/GDP 0.026  0.019  0.0178  0.0680 
 (0.83)  (0.62)  (0.74)  (0.66) 
Polity   -0.052  -0.049  -0.2511  0.0998 
 (0.52)  (0.48)  (1.87)*  (0.22) 
-2.662 -2.716  -2.5255  -6.2149  Years of secondary 
schooling (2.21)**  (2.27)**  (1.32)  (1.23) 
Constant 74.456  71.027  -0.8885  10.8822 
 (4.43)***  (4.18)***  (0.11)  (0.69) 
Period dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Continental  dummies  No No No  Yes 
Observations  231 231 167  167 
Number of countries  73  73  55  55 
R-sq 0.19  0.19     
Rho 0.86  0.85     
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions 
   18.18  8.11 
P-value     1.00  1.00 
Test for AR(1)      -3.41  -2.06 
P-value     0.00  0.04 
Test for AR(2)      1.60  0.63 
P-value     0.11  0.53 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
The panel data GMM-IV method includes in the instruments matrix  lagged values  of the variables in levels and in 
differences  (as described in the methodological section). Also, we include in this matrix some external (strictly exogenous) 
instruments such the countries legal origin, the absolute value of its geographical latitude, and an index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. 
Table 6. Panel Data Analysis: Fixed Effects and GMM-IV Methods 
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 The fixed effects models in the first two columns of Table 6 show no statistical 
relationship between international remittances and income inequality, either in the linear or in the 
quadratic specification. Although one must take in account that these results may be driven by 
the problems mentioned above, such as autocorrelation and endogeneity, which will make our 
estimates biased and inefficient. Nevertheless, we find that our specifications have a very high 
explanatory power, as shown by the R-square, moreover, great part of the variation of the Gini 
coefficient is explained by the country specific (time invariant) characteristics, as can be seen in 
the high values of the Rho. 
The problems that may be biasing our coefficients in the fixed effects model are solved 
using the GMM-IV models in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6. As mentioned above, the consistency 
of the estimators heavily relies on the robustness of the instruments used, as well as the 
autocorrelation structure of the error term. In columns 3 and 4 we show the Sargan tests of 
overidentified restrictions. The values obtained reject the hypothesis of not robust instruments. 
The autocorrelation structure of the error terms are tested using the AR(1) and AR(2) tests. We 
expect to accept the first order serial correlation for the differenced error term, but to reject the 
second order serial correlation. Accepting that the differenced error term has these characteristics 
is the same as saying that the error term of the levels equation shows no serial correlation, which 
is a desirable property. The values obtained for these tests fail to reject the first-order serial 
correlation and do reject the hypothesis that the differenced error term is AR(2). 
The positive and significant coefficients found for the first lag of the Gini coefficient 
confirms previous evidence pointing out that the Gini coefficient is a persistent series over time, 
which may have been biasing the coefficients estimated using fixed effects models in columns 1 
and 2. Finally, regarding to our interest variable, we obtain a positive and significant coefficient 
for the linear term of remittances and a negative and significant one for the quadratic term. The 
evidence found using the dynamic panel data models are highly consistent with the results found 
in Table 4, which gives support to the underlaying hypothesis of the existence of a non 
monotonic relationship between international remittances and income inequality. Moreover, the 
results obtained using different econometric methods and alternative measures of income 
inequality show the robustness of our results. 
 5. Possible Interactions 
 
Up to this point, we have shown that there exists an inverted U curve in the relationship between 
international remittances and income inequality. But, what drives one country or another to be in 
the upward or downward-sloping section of the curve? In order to address this question, we test 
several interactive terms in our benchmark regressions of Table 4. Particularly, we test if the 
level of financial development and the years of education help countries to reach faster the 
inequality increasing section of the curve in regard to its relationship with income inequality. 
  Several studies have documented the relevance of financial mechanisms as a channel to 
lower the costs of sending remittances and making it easier for lower income households to have 
access to the money sent by their relatives working in foreign countries (World Bank, 2006).  It 
has been shown that households with a higher average level of education tend to invest money 
received from remittances in the accumulation of human capital and durable assets, increasing 
their capacity to generate higher incomes in the long term. To test this hypothesis, we include in 
equation (1) the interactive terms mentioned above. We will have: 
2
11 2 1 * ii i i i i i yX r e m r e m r e m Z α βδ δ λ ε =+ + + + +           (5) 
where Zi represents our interest interactions, namely, financial development (as proxied by the 
liquid liabilities), and education (proxied by the average years of secondary schooling). Deriving 
this equation with respect to remi and maximizing this function, we will have: 

















Z + δ λ




From equation (6), it is clear that a negative sign on the coefficient of the interactive term 
will move the inflexion point to the left, leading to some countries that were on the inequality 
increasing section of the curve to be in the inequality decreasing section. In Table 7 we include 
the interactive term between remittances and years of secondary education and with our measure 
of financial development. The regressions shown are the same as those in column 3 of Table 4, 
but including the corresponding interactive term. When we include the quadratic term for 
remittances, we find a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between average 
years of secondary schooling and remittances, as well as statistically significant coefficients for 
  24our remittances coefficients. This result has the effect of moving the curve to the left and 
lowering the inflection point, which means that countries with higher educational levels 
receiving remittances will more quickly reach the turning point at the inequality-decreasing 
section of the curve. Several studies point out the effect of higher educational levels on the way 
households diversify their investment porafolio. In this sense, an plausible interpretation of the 
results obtained for the interaction between education and international remittances is that 
falimiles with a higher educational levels will tend to invest the remittances received in 
productive assets with a higher rate of return, which will increase long-term income. 
   
Table 7. Interactive Terms between International Remittances, 
Years of Schooling and Financial Development 
 
 Gini  coef. 
Remittances/GDP 23.825  28.245 
 (4.73)***  (4.69)*** 
(Remittances/GDP)
2   -7.354  -10.153 
 (2.50)**  (3.27)*** 
Log(Initial GDP pc)  2.481  2.003 
 (1.64)  (1.19) 
GDP growth  -0.146  -0.400 
 (0.23)  (0.59) 
M3/GDP -0.043  -0.090 
 (0.55)  (1.84)* 
Polity   -0.237  -0.205 
 (0.97)  (0.84) 
-3.327 -1.461  Years of secondary schooling 
(2.12)** (0.81) 
(Remittances/GDP)*(M3/PBI) -0.095  
 (1.17)   
 -4.430  (Remittances/GDP) * (Years of 
secondary schooling    (1.96)* 
Constant 22.402  25.225 
 (2.35)**  (2.33)** 
Observations 65  65 
R-sq 0.50  0.52 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1%. The benckmark specification used on these regressions is the one shown on column 3 of 
Table 4. The  instrumental variable used is the cost of obtaining a passport, which was always 
significant at the conventional levels on the first stage regressions. 
 
  25In the same line, column 2 of Table 7 provides evidence on the effect of the interaction of 
the development of the financial markets and international remittances on income inequality. 
Although we find a statistically insignificant coefficient for this interactive term, the result yields 
with a negative sign.
17 Countries with a higher development of financial markets will allow an 
easier and cheaper transmtion of international remittances (Freund and Spatafora, 2005); lower 
transaction costs will allow poorer households to receive remittances at earlier stages of 
migration history, compared to how long they would have wait if financial markets were less 
developed. This effect will tend to move the inflection point of our inverted U to the left, 
allowing countries with a higher development of the financial markets which receives 
remittances to reach the downward sloping portion of the curve easier. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided comprehensive empirical evidence on the relationship between 
international remittances and income inequality. Using several cross section techniques, 
instrumental variables, as well as panel data methodologies that address the problems of 
endogeneity and serial correlation, we have found robust evidence of an inverted U-curve 
between these variables. 
Our findings provide empirical support for previous theoretical work on endogenous 
migration costs. These theories explain how the formation of migrants’ networks in the foreign 
country has the effect of lowering the migration costs for low income potential migrants, making 
the relationship between remittances and inequality as one, shaping an inverted U curve. The 
intuition behind the existence of an inverted U curve is that, in the initial stages of migration 
history, with high migration and information costs, the opportunity cost of the migration decision 
can only be afforded by people in the higher stances of income distribution. The remittances sent 
by these migrants have the effect of increasing levels of income inequality. As noted in several 
sociological studies, migrants in each country tend to establish a community that keep close 
relation with their home communities. These networks have the effect of lowering opportunity 
costs for new migrants due to connections in the labor market, and settlement and information 
costs, for example. The network effects will then make migration affordable for households in 
                                                 
17 When testing the regression using continental dummies we obtain a significant coefficient for the interactive term, 
although these results are not as robust as those shown for the interactions between remittances and years of 
secondary schooling. 
  26the lowest levels of income distribution. When this happens, the migration and remittances sent 
by these migrants will tend to reduce income inequality. 
Also, using interactive terms in our regression analysis, we show how countries with 
higher educational levels, on the one hand, and higher levels of financial sector development, on 
the other,  can more quickly reach the inequality-decreasing section of the relationship. 
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  30Appendix 1.  The System GMM Estimator 
 
A basic outline of the GMM-System method is presented below. For ease of exposition, each 
section of the system is presented separately although as mentioned above, the entire system is 
estimated jointly. 
(i) System in First Differences. We eliminate the unobserved country-specific effects by 
specifying the regression equation (2a) in first differences: 
 
For this specification, the choice of instruments requires dealing with two problems. First, the 
possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables, Z = [X’ S’]’, which is reflected in the 
correlation between these variables and the error term. Second, the new error term, ( åi, ô - åi, ô-
1), is correlated by construction with the differenced lagged dependent variable, (yi, ô-1 - yi, ô-
2). According to this procedure, we allow for the possibility of simultaneity and reverse 
causation, instead of assuming strict exogeneity (i.e., no correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error term at all leads and lags). We adopt the more flexible assumption of 
weak exogeneity, with the current explanatory variables being affected by past and current 
realizations of the dependent variable, but not by its future innovations. Under the assumptions 
that (a) the error erm, å, does not exhibit serial correlation, and (b) the explanatory variables are 
weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions apply: 
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The GMM-IV estimator is based on the moment conditions and is known as the 
differences  estimator. Although asymptotically consistent, this estimator has low asymptotic 
precision and large biases in small samples, which leads to the need to complement it with the 
regression equation in levels. 
(ii) System in Levels. For this part of the system, the country-specific factor is not directly 
eliminated but must be controlled for by the use of instrumental variables. The appropriate 
instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables 
if the following assumption holds. Although there may be correlation between the levels of the 
right-hand side variables and the country-specific effect, there is no correlation between the 
  31differences of these variables and the country-specific effect. This assumption results from the 
following stationarity property: 
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Therefore, the additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the regression in 
levels) are given by the following equations: 
 
Using the moment conditions, we employ a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure to generate consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. The weighting matrix for 
GMM estimation can be any symmetric, positive-definite matrix, and we obtain the most 
efficient GMM estimator if we use the weighting matrix corresponding to the variance-
covariance of the moment conditions. Since this variance-covariance is unknown, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest the following two-step procedure: first, 
assume that the residuals, åi,t, are independent and homoskedastic both across countries and over 
time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is used to produce first-
step coefficient estimates. We construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix 
of the moment conditions with the residuals obtained in the first step, and we use this matrix to 
reestimate our parameters of interest (i.e. second-step estimates). Asymptotically, the second-
step estimates are superior to the first-step ones in so far as efficiency is concerned. In this paper, 
the moment conditions are applied so that they correspond to all available periods, as opposed to 
each moment condition corresponding to a particular time period. In the former case, the number 
of moment conditions is independent of the number of time periods, whereas in the latter case, it 
increases more than proportionally with the number of time periods. Most of the literature 
dealing with GMM estimators applied to dynamic models of panel data treats the moment 
conditions as applying to a particular time period.  
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